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A DEBATE FRAMED BY FALLACIES
By ROBERT JENKINS*
Robert Jenkins addresses three myths propagated by banking
lobbyists. The first is that society must choose between safety and
growth. The second is that markets must choose between safety and
shareholder value. The third is that governments must choose between
safety and financial competitiveness. According to Jenkins, these are
false choices that have distorted the debate and delayed effective
reform. Remove these myths, he argues, and better reform will follow.
Good afternoon.
Our theme for discussion is: "Striking the balance between
domestic priorities and international convergence: the challenge of
regulatory coordination." The topic as tabled presumes tensions and
trade-offs. Alas, this is the perception and has become the reality. Need
it be so? Perhaps. But the regulatory reform debate has suffered
needlessly for having been framed by a series of false choices advanced
by lobbyists and accepted as given. This is true at both the domestic and
international level. One result is suboptimum regulation; another is to
make global coordination more difficult than it need be. Remove these
myths and one might be more quick to agree than one might imagine.
Perhaps that was precisely the worry of those who advanced the myths
to begin with.
Here are three such myths which lead to false choices, which in
turn create tensions both domestic and international.
The first myth is that we must choose between safety and
growth. The banking lobby would have us believe that higher capital
requirements and lower leverage will damage economic growth and
retard recovery. "Increase our capital requirements and we will reduce
our lending!" You have heard it before. I can hear it now. But take a
minute to do the math. Bank "A" has a trillion euro balance sheet
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supported by 50 billion of equity. Now, let's double the equity required
to 100 billion and retire 50 billion of bank debt. Has the balance sheet
shrunk? No. Has the bank had to cut credit? No. Does more capital
necessarily lead to less lending? No. So does society have to choose
between safety and growth? No. So much for myth number one.' But if
you fall for this fallacy you will agonize between doing what is right for
the economy short term and what is right for stability and your country
long term. Bankers have exploited this fear. Depending on their political
weight, the degree of banking recapitalization required, and the
prospects for domestic growth, different nations will automatically have
different views as to the appropriate levels of capital and the timing
with which to reach them.
To the exposure of myth number one, bankers retort: "How
dumb can you be?" "Equity is expensive. Make us double our equity
and you will lower our Return on Equity (ROE), 2 damage shareholder
value, and discourage the supply of bank capital." Here we have myth
number two. Let me take it in two parts.
First, short-term ROE is a poor proxy for medium term
profitability, much less shareholder value. Just ask yourself: has this
fixation on double-digit ROE increased shareholder value over time?
No. Did the annual emphasis on ROE produce attractive and
sustainable shareholder returns? No. So, does a short-term focus on
ROE equate to medium-term profitability and long-term shareholder
value? No. Why? Because it does not adjust for risk. The returns may
come short term, but the risks come later. (Later came recently.)
Second, the prospective investor is no longer interested in
promises of short-term ROE; he is interested in achieving attractive
risk-adjusted returns. The higher the perceived risk, the higher the
return required; the lower the perceived risk, the lower the return
expected. Capital will flow in either combination but its price will be
different. Banks with little equity and lots of leverage are more risky
than those with less leverage and more equity. Investors in both bank
1. For further support, read the ICB Report of 2011 or the recently released IMF
report on the matter. See Andr6 Oliveira Santos & Douglas Elliott, Estimating the Costs of
Financial Regulation (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note SDN/12/l 1, 2012),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdnl211.pdf.
2. ROE refers to the amount of net income returned over a full fiscal year as a
percentage of shareholders equity.
52 [Vol. 18
DEBATE FRAMED BY FALLACIES
equity and bank debt will charge accordingly. That "charge" is the
bank's cost of capital. And given that markets reward more predictable
earnings with higher multiples, even lower earnings need not lower the
market cap, dividends, or shareholder returns. Not convinced? Look at
bank share prices. The market is attaching relatively higher valuations
to the relatively less leveraged.
The third myth follows from the second-to wit: governments
must choose between domestic financial stability and the
competitiveness of their domestic financial centers. Clearly, if you
believe that higher capital requirements damage bank profitability and
shareholder returns then you must also fear for the competitiveness of
your domestic banking champions, the attractiveness of your country as
a global finanz platz and the tax take for your treasury.3 But as we have
seen, one need not choose between safer banks and profitable banking.
PricewaterhouseCoopers underscores this point in its recent report,
Banking Industry Reform. a New Equilibrium.4 Less leverage will not
only be rewarded with a lower cost of capital but also in lower costs for
most sources of funding-from bank debt to wholesale deposits. And
in terms of market share, the strongest banks are growing their clientele
(e.g., revenue) at the expense of weaker competitors. In a world of
increased risk awareness, letting your banks off the capital hook will
likely damage, not enhance, their ability to compete. Extend the
analogy to your country as a financial centre: where would clients and
counterparties best like to do business? In a stable, well regulated
regime? Or in one burying problems and ducking issues because
regulators fear their banking system is too fragile to fix? Needless to
say, the alternative-light touch/highly leveraged regimes-proved
devastating to gross domestic product, to the taxman's take, and to
public confidence in banking and its regulation.
Now at this juncture you will be asking: if these are myths, why
do bankers propagate them? Are they not working for their
shareholders? Do they not have a paramount interest in financial
3. Finanz platz refers to a location that is home to a large number of financial
institutions and where financial transactions can flow without restrictions.
4. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BANKING INDUSTRY REFORM: A NEw EQUILIBRIUM
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stability? Do they not want their respective financial centers to be strong
and confidence-inspiring? Surely they would never dream of putting
their personal interests ahead of those of society and their owners? I let
you be the judge. But I can think of a few possible explanations. First, it
is conceivable that many bankers simply do not understand the basics.
Have you met a single senior banker who understands his cost of
capital? I have not-though I should probably get out more. Second,
many do not fully understand the notion of risk-adjusted returns-
witness their recent quest gone wrong of chasing returns without
adequate understanding of risk. Third, many managements remain
transfixed by the notion of ROE as the primary measure of profitability.
They have promised it to their boards and to their shareholders. The
targets were written into their remuneration plans. Results fed their
bonuses. And there is no doubt about it, all else being equal, higher
equity will reduce the measure of short term ROE. Never mind that it is
the wrong measure and therefore the wrong target. Finally, it is possible
that some bankers and boards actually wish they had more capital-but
dare not admit it without putting their jobs at risk. This is partly because
many have insisted throughout that they were "well-capitalized" and
partly because they demonstrably failed to tap the market for equity
each time it could have been had more cheaply.
Now on these points I have both good news and bad. The good
news is that there is progress to report. First, ROE targets are being
revised downwards or de-emphasized. Two banking behemoths,
Deutsche Bank and Barclays, have done so in the recent weeks.5 More
will follow-partly because their managements cannot achieve the old
(non-risk adjusted) ROE targets and partly because the market would
not reward their share and bond prices if they tried to do so. Second,
the structure of bank compensation is changing. The tilt towards shares,
longer vesting periods, plus the introduction of clawbacks means that
executive pay will be better tied to the risks that they take as well as the
rewards that they claim. Third, balance sheet strength is increasingly
understood to be a source of competitive advantage-by clients if not
yet completely by bank management. And fourth, the change of
5. See, e.g., Nicholas Comfort & Annette Weisbach, Deutsche Bank to Review Pay,
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leadership at the top of many financial institutions offers the new
management a one-time window to do what the market is demanding. 6
The bad news is that the old guard did such a good job of
scaring the bejesus out of politicians that the regulatory landscape still
reflects the shibboleths of the last five years. Second, a few of the high
profile survivors of the trauma still believe in these fantasies-or at
least want you to believe. Subsequent scandals notwithstanding, these
titans must be the smartest of us all, right? Last, but not least, is the fact
that many western financial institutions have yet to come clean because
to do so would reveal their fragility and trigger the very equity issuance
which they maintain to be unnecessary. And here you would be right to
ask: in such cases would the capital be available? Answer: for the viable
firm yes-perhaps not at the price that current shareholders would like
to see but most certainly at a price which new shareholders would
embrace. At the right price, the money would come-although the
management might have to go. If the equity is not available at any price
then the institution should go as well. And there's the rub.
In summary, governments and their regulators have been
operating on the basis of a series of myths and false choices. This has
produced suboptimum reform and complicated international
coordination. In reality, one need not choose between better capitalized
banks and economic growth. One need not choose between safer banks
and profitable banking. And one need not choose between a stronger
banking system and one that can compete-to the contrary. But as long
as such fallacies frame the regulatory debate, decision makers will think
in terms of trade-offs both domestic and international. Trade-offs in turn
imply winners and losers. And given the primacy of national interest
and continued (albeit reduced) influence of the banking lobby,
international cooperation will suffer-producing agreements at the level
of the lowest common denominator and woefully insufficient to resolve
the greatest regulatory challenge of our time. Remove the myths and
better regulation and coordination will follow. It's not too late.
One final observation: the degree to which the banking system
6. Simon Howard, Banking on Barclays, FORUM FOR THE FUTURE: ACTION FOR A
SUSTAINABLE WORLD, FORUM BLOG (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.forumforthefuture.org/blog/banking-barclays. Forum for the Future, a
registered charity founded in 1996, works with businesses and individuals to offer training
programs and partnerships geared towards achieving sustainability goals.
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is sufficiently capitalized is the degree to which we can absorb bank
failures safely. The degree to which we can let banks fail safely is the
degree to which we can reduce the ever expanding rule book aimed
partly at preventing banks from failing. In an earlier speech entitled
"Let's Make a Deal"'7 I offered, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, to roll
back the regulatory rule book in return for sharply higher capital levels.
And in his recent address, Andy Haldane suggested that increasing the
number and complexity of rules could well prove less effective than
simply lowering levels of leverage.8 Needless to say, global regulators
would have less to argue about if there were fewer rules to coordinate
and fewer regulations to enforce.
7. Robert Jenkins, Member of the Fin. Pol'y Comm., Bank of Eng., Let's Make a
Deal, Speech at the Worshipful Company of Actuaries, Haberdasher's Hall, London (July
10, 2012).
8. Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & Member of the Fin. Pol'y Comm.,
Vasileios Maduoros, Economist, Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee, Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's 36th Economic Policy Symposium, "The Changing
Policy Landscape," Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2012).
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